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bstract
he aim of this article is to verify how the mutualism model is applied in cooperatives to mitigate risks. We conducted a single, holistic case study of
n agribusiness cooperative in Paraná State. The data were collected from June to September 2014. Four applications of the mutualism model were
dentified, specifically to mitigate risks of weather for grain (corn, beans and soybeans) farmers, death by lightning, brucellosis and tuberculosis for
attle farmers and the volatility of prices for pig farmers. Through the mutualism model, it was observed that cooperatives find solutions for their
pecific agribusiness sector problems. Cooperative companies are the managers and coordinators of the entire insurance mechanism to address
he risks involved in their activities or/and the activities of their members. The mutualism model has been effective for covering common risks.
owever, like regular insurance, it proved to be ineffective in the case of catastrophes.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
esumo objetivo desse artigo foi verificar como o sistema de mutualismo é aplicado em uma cooperativa para a mitigac¸ão de riscos, como opc¸ão à
ontratac¸ão de seguros tradicionais. Para tanto, foi feito um estudo de caso único, holístico, em uma cooperativa agroindustrial no Estado do
araná, com dados levantados entre junho e setembro de 2014. Foram identificadas quatro aplicac¸ões do mutualismo na cooperativa estudada,
specificamente para mitigac¸ão de riscos de intempéries para produtores de grãos (milho, soja e feijão); para mitigac¸ão de riscos da volatilidade de
rec¸os de suínos; e para a mitigac¸ão de riscos de morte por raio, brucelose e tuberculose (bovinos). Foi verificado que por meio da mutualidade as
ooperativas constituem soluc¸ões para problemas próprios do seu meio e específicos do setor do agronegócio. As cooperativas são coordenadoras
 administradoras de todo o mecanismo de seguro mútuo para atender aos riscos envolvidos em atividades desenvolvidas nelas e/ou pelos seus∗ Corresponding author at: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Escola de Negócios – PPGCOOP, Rua Imaculada Conceic¸ão, 1155, 80215-901 Curitiba,
R, Brazil.
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cooperados. O mutualismo se mostrou eficaz em diversas situac¸ões identificadas de sinistros. Entretanto, a exemplo das formas de seguro tradicionais,
em caso de catástrofes o sistema não alcanc¸a a cobertura necessária.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Seguro; Mutualismo; Gestão de riscos; Cooperativas
Resumen
El objetivo en este estudio fue verificar cómo se aplica el sistema de mutualismo en una cooperativa con el fin de mitigar el riesgo, como una
alternativa al contrato de seguro tradicional. Para ello, se llevó a cabo un estudio de caso único, holístico, en una cooperativa agroindustrial
ubicada en el estado de Paraná. Los datos fueron recolectados en el período comprendido entre junio y septiembre de 2014. Se identificaron cuatro
aplicaciones del mutualismo en la cooperativa estudiada, específicamente para mitigar los riesgos de las intemperies para productores de granos
(maíz, soja y frijoles/porotos); para mitigar los riesgos de la volatilidad de los precios del cerdo; y para mitigar los riesgos de muerte por rayos,
brucelosis y tuberculosis (de vacunos). Se encontró que, por medio de la mutualidad, las cooperativas constituyen soluciones para problemas
propios de su entorno y específicos de la agroindustria. Las cooperativas son coordinadoras y gestoras de todo el mecanismo de seguro mutuo para
hacer frente a los riesgos involucrados en actividades desarrolladas en las mismas y/o por sus afiliados. El mutualismo se muestra eficaz en diversas
situaciones identificadas de siniestros. Sin embargo, como en las formas de seguro tradicional, en caso de catástrofes, el sistema no alcanza la
cobertura necesaria.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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In farming activities, such as planting crops and raising ani-
als, risks are a serious factor. According to Börner (2006),
isks in agriculture stem from a number of origins: risks to pro-
uction (climate, pests, sanitary factors, etc.); risks involving
rices/market (fluctuating prices and/or demand, etc.); institu-
ional risks (government actions or lack of government actions,
egulations, etc.) and personal/human risks (accidents, disease,
tc.). For some types of risks there are efficient means of pro-
ection, made available on the market or by the government.
owever, for other types, farmers become the exclusive risk
akers (Moreira, Souza, & Duclós, 2014). Due to the variety of
isks and their origins in agribusiness and the inherent particular
onditions of each type of farmer, there is no single, common
anagerial strategy that can be used by all farmers to mitigate
hem, and a variety of tools are required to manage them (USDA,
007).
For farmers, managing risks means determining combina-
ions of actions that represent different levels of risk and return
Gomes, 2000). Some strategies aim to reduce risk, such as diver-
ification of activities. Others aim to share and/or transfer risks,
uch as future contracts, production contracts and insurance
Moreira, 2009).
For risks associated with climate and/or sanitary problems,
here are tools that help to foresee the occurrence of these
isks and analyze their possible impact. However, many of the
trategies and tools are often inaccessible to farmers, especially
hose who operate small farms. Insurance, particularly agricul-
ural insurance, could be the right tools for addressing risks of
roduction, but there are a number of difficulties that face both
s
a
nnsurance companies and farmers. These include high premiums
economically unfeasible), low involvement of government
olicies (subsidies), imminent exposure to catastrophes, lack
f regulation agencies to guarantee legitimacy and maintain a
istorical and statistical database and complexity in adminis-
rative organization (experts, technicians, control mechanisms)
Ozaki, 2006).
An alternative to purchasing traditional insurance is mutual
nsurance. In this type of mutualism, the interested parties form
roups with the same goals to establish a financial fund or seek
 commitment that can compensate for future losses in their
hared activities. Normally, it falls to cooperatives to organize,
anage and monitor this type of insurance.
Agricultural cooperatives play a fundamental role in
itigating the risks of agribusiness (Moreira, 2009). As a
ooperative becomes the agency that represents the interests
f the cooperative members and works directly to organize the
roduction chain, concern over the possible impacts of risks,
oth internal and external, is the frequent object of evaluation in
he management of cooperatives, along with seeking solutions
o mitigate them.
Therefore, the aim of this study was to verify how the mutu-
lism system is used by a cooperative to mitigate risks. For
his purpose, the case of a large agricultural cooperative in
araná State is presented, where mutualism is organized and
pplied to crops (grains) and livestock (pigs and milk pro-
uction). As these activities are different in nature, the forms
f mutual assurance are also different and involve different
ources of risks, such as climate conditions, sanitary risks
nd the market, as will be shown throughout the article. The
ext section looks at the central concepts addressed in the
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rticle. This is followed by the case, comments on the data
nd an analysis, with the conclusion bringing to the article to
 close.
heoretical  framework
ooperatives  and  cooperativism
A cooperative is an autonomous association of people vol-
ntarily united to satisfy economic, social and cultural needs
nd aspirations through a collectively owned and democrati-
ally managed company (ICA, 2013). In Brazil, cooperative
ocieties are societies of people, with their own legal constitu-
ion, to provide services to their members. Their legal situation
s currently defined by Law 5.764, enacted on 16 December,
971.
Lago (2009) states that current agricultural cooperativism “is
 form of organization for farming and the coordination of agri-
ultural systems,” and that, through agricultural cooperativism,
embers seek to participate in a competitive market by unit-
ng their production units. Thus, for those involved in Brazilian
gribusiness, cooperatives function as organizations that help to
orm and coordinate the primary sector and act as intermediaries
n the relationship between production and sale.
According to Rodrigues (1997), cooperatives, with their
nique characteristics, constitute the only sector of the economy
hose doctrine emphasizes the balance between the economic
nd the social. This is their first challenge in the face of globaliza-
ion, as efficiency and competitiveness are required. This means
mproved management, reduced costs and differential treatment
or members according to size, efficiency and reciprocation.
The capital structure of agricultural cooperatives in Brazil
omplies with Law 5.764/71, which in its first article defines
ooperative organizations as civilian societies of people rather
han capital. Thus, their capital is composed of shares, with a
imited number for each member, and this value may be pro-
ortional. Shares cannot be used by third parties who are not
embers of the society (Krueger, 2004). At the end of the fiscal
ear, any surplus may be shared according to the activities of
ach member (this is known as a cooperative act), when deliber-
ted and authorized by the Ordinary General Assembly (OGA)
f the cooperative.
According to data from the OCB (2014), in Brazil there
re 6603 cooperatives, with over eleven million members
nd approximately 321,000 employees. Farming and transport,
espectively, account for 23.1% and 16.5% of the total num-
er of cooperatives, followed by credit, with 15.9%, and labor
nions, with 14.7%. According to OCEPAR (2014), in Paraná,
 state with a tradition and vocation for rural activity, 56%
f the agricultural economy is derived from farming coopera-
ives. There are 77 such cooperatives, with 135,000 members
nd responsible for 61,000 direct jobs. The gross turnover
f these cooperatives in 2013 was R$38.6 billion, with a net
urplus of R$1.3 billion. In 2013, this sector exported the equiv-
lent of 2.36 billion dollars, representing 42% of the total
xports of Brazilian exports and 13% of the total exports of the
tate.
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nsurance  and  mutualism
Mutualism is one of the fundamental principles that consti-
utes the basis of every insurance operation. The union of a large
umber of people exposed to the same risks enables a balance
o be established between the payments by the insured (pre-
iums) and the guarantee of the insurer (responsibilities), as
ll the insured pay values that are lower than the insured asset
n the certainty that those who suffer losses will receive full
ompensation to replace their asset (CNSEG, 2014).
According to the legal definition of insurance, as declared
n the Civil Code, Article 1.432, an insurance contract is one
hrough which one of the parties is obliged by the other through
he payment of a premium, to be compensated for damage
esulting from a future risk, as foreseen in the contract. In gen-
ral, insurance can be defined as a mechanism for transferring
he high value of a future and uncertain expense (loss) to an
dvanced, guaranteed payment of a relatively lower value (pre-
ium) (Ozaki, 2006). In accordance with economic and legal
daptations, the main requirements or conditions for insura-
ility are that: (i) the expected loss should be calculable and
he premium economically feasible; (ii) the loss should not
e willful, i.e., it should be accidental; (iii) the loss threat-
ns and considerable number of things, assets or people; and
iv) there should be no catastrophic loss (Gomes, 1998; Ozaki,
006).
An insurance policy can include a fixed or variable premium
n accordance with the technique employed for covering the
isk (Gomes, 1998). Fixed premium insurance is done through
n insurance company, and the documents of the insurer and the
nsured are prepared by different people. The payments made
y the insured party do not vary, as they are set contractually.
Variable premium insurance is adjusted among several peo-
le who mutually assume responsibility for the loss that any of
hem might suffer. In mutual insurance, every interested party
s an insurer of others and is also insured by them. Thus, all
an benefit or lose if they are entitled to compensation or are
bliged to make payments to another party. However, in this
ype of contract, the parties themselves do not act as the insurers
s they belong to the company legally established by the asso-
iation of interested parties. The insured do not pay a premium,
ut rather shares that are sufficient to compensate for loss or
amage and the expenses incurred in administration. For this
eason, contributions to mutual insurance can vary, unlike fixed
remium insurance.
Mutualism is defined as the union of a group of people
ith common insurance interests that compete to form an eco-
omic mass for the purpose of overcoming, at a given moment,
he eventual needs of some of those people. In commercial
nsurance, the insured party pays a premium and receives com-
ensation when a claim is filed. In mutual insurance, instead of
 premium, the insured (mutualists) pay the shares required to
over the expenses of administration and confirmed losses. The
esponsibility of the risk is shared by all the mutualists (Ozaki,
006). This creates the right incentive to reduce fraud as, since
ll the participants share the cost of eventual damage, the insured
an monitor one another (Caffagni & Marques, 1999).
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ethodology
The research strategy that was adopted was the single case
tudy, adapted when the desire is to answer “how” or “why”
n relation to a given phenomenon when the researcher has lit-
le control over events and when the focus is on contemporary
henomena in a given context in real life (Yin, 2010). The case
hat was chosen is typical of the phenomenon in question and
ecisive. In other words, it represents a context in which it is
elieved that the propositions, in the case of the assumptions
nd theoretical postulations of mutualism, are true, which jus-
ifies the single case in accordance with Yin (2010). Given that
he analysis unit was an agricultural cooperative in Paraná State,
hich is understood as unique, it is also a holistic case study. In
his article, to protect the identity of the organization, it is only
eferred to as the “Agricultural Cooperative”.
Primary and secondary data were collected. Two sources of
econdary data were used: documents and archived files. These
ocuments and files provided an understanding of how pre-
iums and claims are calculated, in addition to the history of
pplications. The financial statements and the history of the val-
es practices were also analyzed. The primary data originated
rom semi-structured interviews with managers of each business
nit of the cooperative. The set of data was gathered between
une and September, 2014.
Qualitative analyses of the data were conducted, mainly using
 document analysis technique, in addition to quantitative anal-
ses and economic evaluations, as will be seen.
he  case  of  the  Agricultural  Cooperative
The Agricultural Cooperative is located in Paraná State and
as founded in 1951. Of Dutch origin, it has units in the
unicipalities of Castro, Ponta Grossa, Piraí do Sul, Curiúva
nd Ventania, in Paraná State, and also in the municipality of
taberá, in São Paulo State. The Agricultural Cooperative has
82 members and 961 employees, who produce cereals such
s corn, wheat, barley and oats on a large scale, in addition to
egumes, soy, beans and forage. It also operates in the industri-
lization of milk, potatoes, meat, feed and seeds. The products
ave their own brand and those of third parties. In 2013, its
ross turnover was R$1.7 billion. According to the Globo Rural
anking (2013), the Agricultural Cooperatives is one of the 500
argest organizations in the agribusiness sector, one of the 50
argest per category and one of the 10 largest in the sector.
The Agricultural Cooperative manages mutual insurance
roups for grain, pig and milk farmers. For the grain (soy, corn
nd beans) farmers, the Agricultural Cooperative manages the
ail Mutual Insurance Group, considered the most impactful,
nd the agricultural Mutual Insurance Group, for other weather
onditions, with coverage for soy and corn. For pig farmers,
he cooperative manages the Mutual Insurance Group of for the
laughterhouse of the Piglet Production Unit, whose purpose is
o mitigate the risks of volatile prices. For the milk producers,
he group that is managed is the Mutual Insurance Group for the
anitary Conditions and Lightning. The backgrounds and main
p
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haracteristics of each group are described in the next section,
here the data are presented and analyzed.
resentation  and  discussion  of  data
In this section, the collected data is presented and a discussion
nd analysis for the conclusion.
As commented above, the Agricultural Cooperative manages
utual insurance groups for grain, pig and milk farmers. The
articipation of each group is individualized, and only the coop-
rative members are involved, and not their families. Companies
an participate if they are cooperative members. There are two
orms of admission to a mutual group occurs. The first is that it
s compulsory in the case of a cooperative member financing his
arvest with the cooperative. The second is joining freely. The
haracteristics of each group are given in detail below.
ail  Mutual  Insurance  Group
The Hail Mutual Insurance Group was founded in 1989 at
he cooperative due to the need for coverage because of the most
amaging natural phenomenon in the region, hail. This damage
as covered by insurance, but these policies were economically
nfeasible due to the high cost of the premium and the complex
ay that the damage was measured, which was not satisfactory
o the cooperative and its members.
The group uses the pro rata mutual insurance model and is
ade up of members who farm soy, corn and beans. The entire
lanted area linked to the cooperative is included. The costs
hat are covered are only those raw materials used in the plant-
ng of each crop and the operations involved. This does not
nclude other costs of profits. If a claim is made, the cost is
hared in proportion to the area covered by each member. If there
re no claims, only the administrative expenses (administration,
eports, consultancy, etc.) are shared by the members.
In the Hail Mutual Insurance Group, the Total Gross Indem-
ity Value (TGIV) for soy and corn is calculated based on the
verage productivity per hectare (kg/ha). This productivity is
efined by the lowest value calculated between the average pro-
uction of the cooperative members and the productivity per
ectare of the cooperative members of the group in the three
ears prior to the claim. The method used to calculate the total
ross indemnity for soy and corn is shown in Eq. (1):
GIV =
(
¯XP–AP
60
)
·  a ·  AMP (1)
here TGIV, total gross indemnity value; XP,  average produc-
ivity; AP, actual productivity (kg/ha); a, size of area where the
ail fell; AMP, average market price of a 60 kg sack (of soy or
orn) in Brazilian reais.
For beans, at the Hail Mutual Insurance Group, the reference
alue for indemnity of the cost of the raw materials is Basic Cost
er Hectare (BCH), including seeds, fertilizer and pesticides.
hen assessing the damage, it is necessary to harvest the entire
ffected area for weighing and classification at the Agricultural
ooperative. For the base price of the indemnity, a calculation is
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Table 1
Hailfall and indemnities for soy.
Year Harvest Members registered Area covered (ha) Claims Indemnity (R$) Shared cost (R$/ha)
2009 2008/2009 184 35,269.63 3 117,924.22 3.34
2010 2009/2010 197 39,370.20 0 – –
2011 2010/2011 201 49,239.98 17 1,554,584.13 31.57
2012 2011/2012 224 51,042.16 18 468,410.14 9.18
2013 2012/2013 110 29,281.84 6 150,237.09 5.13
2014 2013/2014 73 17,116.53 3 73,278.19 4.28
A  
S
m
a
F
o
o
f
T
w
(
t
a
h
2
f
w
a
e
p
s
o
o
a
h
t
o
f
a
e
p
i
a
m
w
f
e
s
t
w
i
s
t
i
g
A
u
d
M
c
m
d
T
H
Y
2
2
2
2
2
2
A
Sverages 165 36,886.72
ource: Agricultural Cooperative.
ade between the highest minimum price of the product is used
s published in the Harvest Plan of the Ministry of Agriculture,
ishing and Supplies (MAPA), and the average commercial price
f the month of the harvest, as practiced in the commercial sector
f the Cooperative. The calculation of the Total Gross Indemnity
or beans is shown in Eq. (2):
GIV =
(
BCV–
(
AP
60
·  BP
))
· a  (2)
here TGIV, total gross indemnity value; BCV, basic cost value
cost of production, i.e., fertilizer, seeds, pesticides and cultiva-
ion); AP, actual production (kg/ha); BP, base price of indemnity;
, size of area where the hail fell, in hectares. Table 1 shows the
istory hailfall and the indemnities paid by the fund for soy from
009 to 2014.
Table 2 shows the historical background of hailfall and claims
rom the fund for corn from 2009 to 2014.
On average, during the period in question, over 7 farmers
ere affected and made claims of R$394,072.30, representing
n average shared cost of R$8.92/ha, the value contributed by
ach member of the mutual insurance group. The highest claim
er hectare was R$31.57. It should be noted that hailfall on the
oy crop is frequent. During the period in question, there was
nly one year without hailstones. Considering the number of
ccurrences and the number of members in the mutual insur-
nce group, on average, 5% of the members made claims due to
ailfall, i.e., they were also benefitted by the mutual insurance in
he proportional share of the damage, showing the importance
f this form of insurance.
On average, during the period in question, fewer than 2
armers made claims, at a value of R$98,259.45, representing
n average shared cost of R$9.96/ha, the value contributed by
r
m
a
I
able 2
ailfall and indemnities for corn.
ear Harvest Members registered Area covered (ha)
009 2008/2009 143 22,920.73 
010 2009/2010 124 13,091.83 
011 2010/2011 126 14,255.68 
012 2011/2012 151 17,795.98 
013 2012/2013 56 6783.28 
014 2013/2014 29 3722.24 
verages 105 13,094.96 
ource: Agricultural Cooperative.7.8 394,072.30 8.92
ach participating member of the group. The highest indemnity
ayment per hectare was R$33.08. Hailfall on corn is low. Dur-
ng the period in question, there were 629 cooperative members
nd only 9 claims. The shared value for the group as a whole
ay be considered small, but significant for the farmers who
ere forced to make a claim.
Table 3 shows the history of hailfall and indemnity payments
rom the fun for the bean crop from 2009 to 2014.
On average, during the period in question, fewer than 2 farm-
rs made claims, at values of R$285,275.69, representing a
hared cost of R$27.28/ha, the value contributed by each par-
icipating member of the group. The highest claim per hectare
as R$162.31. During the period in question, damage was done
n only 2 years. In 2012, the damage caused by hailfall was
evere and the shared cost per hectare was high. In this case,
here was a concentration of areas covered by the cooperative,
.e., cooperative members with large areas registered suffered
reater damage, leading to higher costs for the other members.
n analysis shows the deficiency of the mutual insurance in sit-
ations of concentration or catastrophe, where the mechanism
oes not benefit all those involved.
utual  Farming  Insurance  Group
The Mutual Farming Fund was created in 2008 to provide
overage for other events not covered by the hail group. It is
ade up of soy and corn farmers and provides coverage for
amage resulting from extreme weather such as frost, heavy
ainfalls during the harvest and drought, excluding all other cli-
atic factors. The members must participate in the group with
ll their planted area, by crop, associated with the Cooperative.
t is a mutual insurance model with a membership fee.
 Claims (N◦) Indemnity (R$) Shared cost (R$/ha)
1 2888.40 0.13
0 – –
1 24,734.09 1.74
5 437,429.12 24.58
1 1372.05 0.20
1 123,133.03 33.08
1.5 98,259.45 9.96
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Table 3
Hailfall and indemnities for beans.
Year Harvest Members registered Area covered (ha) Claims Indemnity (R$) Shared cost (R$/ha)
2009 2008/2009 108 8542.81 0 – –
2010 2009/2010 115 8916.00 0 – –
2011 2010/2011 169 14,561.95 3 20,275.33 1.39
2012 2011/2012 126 10,420.81 8 1,691,378.81 162.31
2013 2012/2013 56 5661.32 0 – –
2014 2013/2014 50 4007.86 0 – –
Averages 104 8685.13 1.8 285,275.69 27.28
Source: Agricultural Cooperative.
Description SOJA MILHO
Coverage level (CL) for a farmer with a history 60% 65%
Coverage level (CL) for a farmer with no history 1800 kg/ha 5500 kg/ha 
Indemnity ceiling (BCV) R$ 1610.00/ha  R$ 2406.00/ha
Membership fee 2.50% 3.00%
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Source: Agricu
The need to create this group was seen when severe damage
uring two consecutive harvests as a result of heavy rainfall
n 2004/2005 and a drought in 2005/2006, leaving coopera-
ive members heavily in debt and forced to renegotiate debts.
 solution was sought through official insurance, but this did
ot meet the needs of the members, the main barriers being:
i) high insurance premiums; (ii) average productivity based
n the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE),
hich are beyond the reality of the cooperative, although it is
he recognized benchmark in technology with high averages of
gricultural productivity; (iii) and the methods for measuring
amage (in official insurance, the value is determined by the
armer when, on average, there are large and highly produc-
ive areas to offset losses, i.e., to have an average product, the
roposal would include measurement by size of plot of land or
lebe). Faced with these difficulties with regular insurance, the
utual Fund was formed to cover the costs of raw materials up
o the cost of financing the planting of the crop.
The reference value for indemnity is the value of the inputs
f the BCV, such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. If there is
amage (claims), the value is covered by the membership fees
ollected for the fund throughout the period, and the limit on
he value of coverage for damage is set by the current balance
s
v
i
a
able 4
vents and indemnities from the mutual farming fund for soy.
ear Harvest Members registered Coverage (R
009 2008/2009 163 26,699,280.
010 2009/2010 170 35,737,005.
011 2010/2011 130 36,346,560.
012 2011/2012 131 32,561,828.
013 2012/2013 92 26,836,277.
014 2013/2014 39 12,581,924.
verages 121 28,460,479.
ource: Agricultural Cooperative.e mutual farming fund.
 Cooperative.
f the fund, as shown in Fig. 1. If there is not damage, any
dministrative expenses (administration, reports, consultancy,
tc.) will be paid by the fund.
The maximum indemnifiable limit, the maximum indemnifi-
ble price and the total gross indemnity for soy or corn are
alculated using the following equations:
IL =
¯XPCoop · CL
60
(3)
IP = BCV
MIL
(4)
GIV =
( ( ¯XPA3years · CL)–AP
60
)
·  MIP · a  (5)
here MIL, maximum indemnifiable limit (R$/ha); ¯XPCoop,
verage general productivity of the cooperative for the period
kg/ha); CL, coverage level; MIP, maximum indemnifiable price
R$/sack); BCV, basic cost value (cost of production: fertilizers,
eeds, pesticides and cultivation); TGIV, total gross indemnity
alue; ¯XPA3years, average productivity of cooperative member
n the last 3 years (kg/ha); AP, actual productivity (kg/ha); a,
rea (ha) where the damage was done.
$) Premiums (R$) Claims (N◦) Indemnity (R$)
00 552,074.24 1 73,833.84
60 893,425.74 4 97,336.31
00 904,946.51 – –
00 814,045.70 1 64,802.27
00 670,907.42 – –
60 314,548.12 5 123,577.41
20 691,657.96 1.83 59,924.97
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Table 4 shows the history of events that led to claims from
he mutual farming fund for the soy crop from 2009 to 2014.
In the period in question, an average of R$691,657.96 was
ollected in premiums, with fewer than 2 claims and an average
f R$59,924.97 in indemnity payments. The highest indemnity
er harvest was R$123,577.41. The total value of premiums
ollected during the period was R$4,149,947.73 for a total of
$359,549.83 in indemnity payments, i.e., 9% of the total col-
ected was used. If the total coverage of R$170,762,875.20 is
onsidered, the balance of the fund would be insufficient, as the
ndemnities are limited to this amount. This aspect is addressed
n the “Norms for the Functioning of the Mutual Farming Fund
nd the Mutual Hail Fund”, which were drafted by the cooper-
tive and agreed upon by all the members of the group. In Item
, “Adaptation of the Functioning of the Mutual Farming and
utual Hail Fund Groups”, Letter (c) the value of coverage for
amage is limited to the existing balance of the fund.
Regarding the number of members registered and the fre-
uency of claims, there was an average of 1.52%, showing the
ow frequency of damage. Therefore, the relationship between
he low levels of occurrence of damage and the values paid
n indemnities show how significant the fund is, as the values
ndemnified were expressive.
Table 5 shows the history of events that led to indemnity
ayments from the mutual farming fund for corn from 2009 to
014.
On average, for the period in question, R$530,931.43 were
ollected in premiums, with fewer than 2 claims on average
nd indemnity payment of R$41,561.17 on average. The highest
mount of indemnity payments per harvest was R$202,654.80.
udging by the conditions of the mutual fund, the value collected
ould be insufficient to cover a catastrophe. The total coverage
or the period was R$107,829,532.90, and the payment for dam-
ge would cease when the balance of the fund was exhausted.
The balance of the fund is administered in accordance with
he “Norms for the Functioning of the Mutual Farming Fund and
he Mutual Hail Fund”, drafted by the cooperative and agreed
pon by the members of the group in Item 2, “Adaptation of
he Functioning of the Mutual Farming and Mutual Hail Fund
roups”, Letter (b) Individualization of the Fund: the individ-
al monitoring of the Mutual Farming Fund is authorized, and
he percentage contributed by each farmer over time can be
nspected”. Thus, the cooperative hopes to keep records of the
alance of the fund and be able to know which members have
ontributed to it. In cases of claims, if the balance of the member
c
t
m
able 5
ccurrence of damage and indemnities from the mutual farming fund for the corn cr
ear Harvest Members registered Coverage (R
009 2008/2009 168 29,214,522.
010 2009/2010 120 23,832,386.
011 2010/2011 75 16,187,215.
012 2011/2012 90 22,010,805.
013 2012/2013 42 10,280,291.
014 2013/2014 20 6,304,313.0
verages 86 17,971,588.
ource: Agricultural Cooperative.inistração 51 (2016) 266–275
s negative, it is possible to charge higher rates to compensate for
sing it or even charge lower rates from those who have never
sed it to cover damage. If there is a better situation or adequate
onditions in the official insurance system, the fund can be liq-
idated and the balance returned to the members. It could also
e incorporated into the reserve funds of the cooperative.
utual  Insurance  Group  of  Slaughterers  at  the  Piglet
roduction Unit
This insurance was created in 2006 for the purpose of min-
mizing the risks of volatile pig prices on the market. It was
reated in the wake of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in
araná State in 2005. In 2006, there was a fall in the price of pork,
hich lasted until mid-2007. This led to debts and renegotiation
he debts of members.
The fund was constituted by cooperative members who are
laughterers at the piglet production unit. The members include
heir entire breeding stock. The system ensures that when pork is
old the price will cover the direct production costs. The differ-
nce between weekly sale prices and the standard cost that will
e paid to the member forms the fund, which can be either nega-
ive or positive, and at the end of the lot it is shared proportionally
o the volume of pork that is sold.
In the mutual fund of the slaughterers at the piglet produc-
ion unit, the mutual insurance mitigates the risks of volatile pig
rices. The system was established by the cooperative members
t the piglet production unit and was designed to ensure that
hen the slaughtered animals are sold the members will receive
 price that covers the direct costs of production. The difference
etween weekly sales prices and the standard cost that will be
aid to the member forms a fund that can be either positive or
egative and, at the end of the lot (period in days of the cycle
etween delivery of a pig that weighs between 20 and 24 kg and
he pig achieving a weight of 100 kg), is shared proportionally to
he volume of pork sold. The indemnity is based on the results
f the fund. At the time of delivery of the product for sale, a
mutual standard price” is set. At the end of the lot, when the
ntire group of pigs is delivered, the real average sale price is
alculated and the result is shared.
The value of the reserve fund of the mutual insurance, the
otal value of the mutual fund, the average price of pork on the
arket, the entitlement value, the value received by the member
op.
$) Premiums (R$) Claims (N◦) Indemnity (R$)
00 780,574.89 5 202,654.80
00 714,965.58 – –
50 494,816.78 – –
10 668,126.16 1 4916.11
22 318,926.65 – –
8 208,178.50 1 41,796.09
82 530,931.43 1.17 41,561.17
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nd the indemnifiable value are calculated using the following
quations:
Rf =  (PMSw–SSP) · QSs (6)
VRf =  MRf1 +  MRf2 +  ·  · ·  +  MRFn  (7)
SMl = (PMSw1 · QSs1) + (PMSw2 · QSs2) + · · · + (PMSwn · QSsn)QSs1 + QSs2 + · · · + QSsn (8)
Vm =  PSMl · QSs (9)
Rc =  SSp · QSs (10)
ind =  EVm ·  VRc (11)
here VRc, value received from cooperative member; SSp,
tandard mutual swine price; QSs, quantity sold; MRf, mutual
eserve fund; PSMw, price of swine on the market that week;
MSl, price of swine lot on the market; TVRf, total value
f reserve fund; EVm, entitlement value for members; Vind,
ndemnifiable value.
Table 6 shows a survey of the claims from 23 lots over a
eriod of eight years of the commercialization of slaughtered
nimals.
As shown, during the period in question, an average of 5.2
armers made claims for 656,250 kg of pig and received an aver-
ge restitution from the mutual fund as the equalization of prices
f R$139,597.50. These values show situations in which farm-
rs obtained a sales price below the average cost of the group.
onsidering the shared values, the high volatility of pig prices is
vident, in comparison, the maximum shared value was six times
v
a
v
t
able 6
omposition of volumes claimed for the commercialization of pigs.
ear Lot No. of participations Coverage (kg) Coverag
006 1st 16 1038.87 2,493,84
2nd 16 1028.16 2,658,06
007 3rd 16 1019.08 3,103,85
4th 16 1009.19 2,679,76
5th 16 1082.16 1,991,63
008 6th 16 1092.46 2,081,72
7th 20 2164.31 4,113,92
8th 20 2186.63 4,828,94
009 9th 20 2124.15 4,660,24
10th 20 2250.89 5,106,13
11th 20 2274.09 5,673,28
010 12th 20 2206.46 6,480,18
13th 28 4769.86 10,706,5
14th 28 4807.30 9,926,70
011 15th 28 4953.31 11,305,1
16th 28 4902.77 12,573,0
17th 28 4997.05 11,736,9
012 18th 28 4801.68 8,991,35
19th 28 4953.31 11,975,6
20th 28 4945.54 15,453,8
013 21st 28 5091.34 16,147,7
22nd 28 4855.63 12,334,9
23rd 28 4997.05 14,521,3
014 24th 28 5038.85 18,430,9
Aver
ource: Agricultural Cooperative.inistração 51 (2016) 266–275 273
igher than the minimum value. In the period in question, a com-
arison between the number of participations and the number of
laims demonstrates the relevance of this mutualism group to
he swine farmers in the cooperative.
utual  Insurance  for  Sanitary  Problems  and  Lightning  for
ilk Farmers
The mutual insurance for sanitary problems and lightning
as created in the early 1980s to support a program to eradicate
rucellosis and tuberculosis in the herds of the members of the
ooperative. Another aim was to minimize the losses caused by
ightning, a common phenomenon in the region, affecting the
ortality of the herd. These factors meant that it was necessary
o assume debts with the cooperative to replace the livestock and
he lost volume of milk. In the case of disease, when the claim for
ndemnity helps the farmer to avoid selling the herd and the pos-
ible spread of diseases, this reduces the risk of compromising
he institutional brand of the cooperative.
In the mutual fund for sanitation and lightning, the coverage
s for losses resulting from the death of animals caused by light-
ing, natural phenomena that are very common in the region,
nd brucellosis and tuberculosis. The principle aim of the mutual
nsurance is to ensure compensation for farmers who have lost
heir herd due to these diseases or as the result of lightning. The
alue of indemnity per animal unit corresponds to 60% of the
verage total annual production of cows on the property. This
alue is obtained by calculating the volume of milk supplied in
he last 12 months, the number of cows in the herd (milk cows
e (R$) No. of claims Claims (kg) Claims (shared in R$)
2.06 5 630,000 144,900.00
7.78 5 630,000 170,100.00
2.02 3 378,000 79,380.00
4.18 6 756,000 120,960.00
6.43 3 378,000 86,940.00
3.71 2 252,000 80,640.00
5.20 4 504,000 70,560.00
2.65 2 252,000 45,360.00
3.49 7 882,000 202,860.00
2.62 6 756,000 151,200.00
1.67 9 1,134,000 283,500.00
8.02 4 504,000 115,920.00
89.02 5 630,000 176,400.00
9.99 5 630,000 119,700.00
50.10 3 378,000 83,160.00
00.15 7 882,000 246,960.00
30.47 9 1,134,000 260,820.00
7.38 4 504,000 105,840.00
92.04 4 504,000 65,520.00
10.89 2 252,000 60,480.00
12.85 6 756,000 128,520.00
78.38 8 1,008,000 191,520.00
70.73 7 882,000 132,300.00
38.04 9 1,134,000 226,800.00
ages 5.2 656,250 139,597.50
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Table 7
Composition of volumes of claims for dead animals.
Year Semester No. of participations Coverage (heads) Coverage (R$) No. of claims Claims (heads) Claims (shares in R$)
2008 1 248 18,290 64,015,000.00 1 11 22,032
2 232 18,150 63,525,000.00 0 0 0
2009 1 235 18,388 64,358,000.00 2 45 155,257
2 239 19,050 66,675,000.00 1 20 69,003
2010 1 241 18,420 73,680,000.00 0 0 0
2 246 18,338 73,352,000.00 2 91 367,806
2011 1 246 18,416 82,872,000.00 1 24 89,477
2 250 18,774 84,483,000.00 3 18 67,108
2012 1 256 18,846 84,807,000.00 1 15 58,178
2 276 19,458 87,561,000.00 0 0 0
2013 1 288 20,120 100,600,000.00 1 10 46,141
2 292 21,292 106,460,000.00 1 12 55,369
2014 1 294 21,324 106,620,000.00 2 179 836,420
verag
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nd dry cows) and the average price paid to the farmer over the
ame period.
The average total cow production per year on the property
nd the indemnifiable value are calculated using the following
quations:
Cp = Tp
UA
·  TPind · QtAc (12)
ind = TCp · 60% · Pr (13)
here TCp, average total annual cow production; Tp, total deliv-
red production in the last 12 months (L); UA,  average annual
umber of cattle in animal unit; TPind, technical parameter for
ndemnity of an adult cattle unit, as described in Fig. 2; QtAc,
uantity of animal claims; Vind, indemnifiable value; Pr, base
ilk price for the month.
The claims made in 13 semesters are shown in Table 7.
In the period in question, there was an average of 1.2 farmers
ith an average claim of 32.7 heads of dead cows. The average
alues of restitution in the form indemnities from the mutual
und was R$135,907. An analysis of the amplitude of the shared
alues, with a minimum of zero and maximum of 836,420 shows
hat the risks involved in this activity are linked to conditions
hat can be monitored but not controlled and can happen to any
ooperative member.
Animal Months of age Parameter
Female ≤  6 0.3
> 6 and ≤ 12 0.5
> 13  and  ≤  24 0.7
> 24 1.0
Male Not inde mnifiab le –
Fig. 2. Parameters for indemnifying adult bovine units.
Source: Agricultural Cooperative.
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oes 1.2 32.7 135,907
onclusion
In all the cases presented, there was at least one recurring con-
ition of insurability and the effectiveness of the mutual system
as evident. It was also observed that, like regular insurance,
he system is not efficient in situations of catastrophe, either in
he form of sharing the cost of damage or with a guarantee fund.
In this article, the main characteristics, forms of calculation
nd histories of the values of claims of the mutual groups man-
ged by the cooperative in question were presented. The groups
ere made up of milk, grain and pig farmers.
The mutual hail group, which is the most traditional group
anaged by the cooperative, has for some time been an impor-
ant safety net for soy, corn and bean farmers in case of damage.
he mutual farming fund, which is complementary to the mutual
ail fund, has also worked effectively in the coverage of damage
nd has seen its balance grow over the years.
In the case of the system implemented for the slaughter house
t the piglet production unit, this system minimizes the risks
rom the market that result from varying sales prices. The coop-
rative also benefits from this protection because it reduces the
redit risk of the cooperative members and helps to guarantee
hat they can honor their commitments. Nevertheless, the sys-
em does not guarantee prices, but is an equalizer that adjusts
he sales price to that of the average pig commercialized within
 given period. In extreme situations, where losses can affect
veryone in the group, the system is not capable of covering all
he financial needs incurred.
The mutualism system implemented by the milk farmers
inimizes the risks of the members when they are exposed to
anitary problems and lightning bolts. In critical situations when
hese risks occur, there is a definite possibility of the destruction
f the breeding stock, meaning that it is no longer possible for the
armer to continue in this activity. This can increase the exposure
f the cooperative member to the risk of lacking supplies for his
ilk production. However, like the other mutual funds of theooperative, although the system meets the needs of members
f the groups, as a financial guarantee for the member to remain
perational, in catastrophic situations with high mortality rates,
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he system would not have sufficient resources to meet all the
nancial needs of the group.
Due to the high frequency rate of damage in farming activi-
ies, protection systems such as insurance and mutualism provide
reater security for farmers. This article demonstrated the impor-
ance of the mutualism systems practiced by an agricultural
ooperative by analyzing practical cases of several types of risk.
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